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Prisoners Dilemma Resolver

Diagnose whether a multi-player conflict is a prisoners' dilemma and design a cooperation mechanism to resolve it. Use when parties are locked in a mutually destructive pattern even though all would benefit from cooperation — price wars, overfishing, arms races, advertising spirals, commons depletion, collective action failures. Distinguishes prisoners' dilemmas (dominant strategy to defect) from coordination problems (no incentive to deviate once aligned) and tailors the remedy accordingly. Produces a structured cooperation design plan: diagnosis, payoff assessment, discount-rate threshold calculation, mechanism selection from a resolution menu (self-enforcement through repeated play, tit-for-two-tats, mutual promises with escrow, linkage, reputation systems, third-party enforcement, Ostrom commons governance), and implementation checklist. Use when someone says 'everyone would be better off if we all cooperated but no one does', 'we keep undercutting each other even though it hurts everyone', 'how do we stop a race to the bottom', 'we need a collective agreement that actually holds', 'our cartel keeps collapsing', 'how do I stop a defection spiral', 'we need to solve a commons problem', or 'is this a coordination problem or a cooperation problem'.

What You'll Need

ReadTodoWrite

Install

1. Add marketplace
/plugin marketplace add bookforge-ai/bookforge-skills
2. Install plugin
/plugin install the-art-of-strategy@bookforge-skills
3. Use the skill
/prisoners-dilemma-resolver
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